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[L. A. No. 23197. In Bank. Jan. 28, 1955.] 
1rI & 1rI LIVESTOCK TRANSPORT COMPANY (a Cor-
poration), Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA AUTO TRANS-
PORT COMPANY et al., Defendants; WALTER 
ALVES et at, Appellants. 
[L. A. No. 23198. In Bank. Jan. 28, 1955.] 
VERN BAKER, Respondent, v . WALTER ALVES et aL, 
Appellants. 
[1] Automobiles-Evidence-Oontributo17 NegUgence.-In action 
by owner of automobile carner truck to recover for damage 
to his truck when he attempted to pass to left of tractor-trailer 
truck on upgrade and was struck by another truck approaching 
from opposite direction, owner of carrier truck. was not con-
tributorily negligent as matter of law where evidence showed 
that his failure to pass tractor-trailer truck prior to collision 
eould be attributed to the slipping of gears which was not his 
fault where, as he eommenced passing, driver of tractor-
trailer truck pulled over to the right indicating he would have 
room even if there was approaching traffic, where view was 
elear for 800 feet, where grade was only S or 4 per cent and 
his truck was unloaded and had previously been gaining speed, 
and where he was not required to assume that approaching 
'Vehicle, which weighed 65,000 pounds and was weaving from 
right to left on highway while traveling downhill at about 50 
miles per hour, would be travelling at such high and uncon-
trollabJe speed that with margin of safety, which he had with 
truck he was attempting to pass, he could not complete the 
passing maneuver. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 3] Automobiles, § 256; [2] Auto-
mobiles, § 155{6). 
D 
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[2] Id.-Contributory Negligence-Overtaking and Passing.-If 
truck driver made mistake in judging his ability to pass safely 
another truck traveling in same direction, that would not 
necessarily be contributory negligence. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Contributory Negligence.-In action by owner 
of unloaded tractor truck to recover for damages to truck 
when vehicle approaching from opposite direction struck auto-
mobile carrier truck, which was attempting to pass tractor-
trailer truck on upgrade, pushing automobile carrier truck 
back until it collided with unloaded tractor truck, which was 
a few feet to rear of tractor-trailer truck at time of collision, 
a finding thnt driver of unloadt>d tractor truck was not guilty 
of contributory negligence was sustained by evidenee from 
which trier of fact could reasonably infer that he had pulled 
up close behind slow-moving tractor-trailer truck with inten-
tion of passing it when highway was clear, since Veh. Code, 
§ 531, providing that truck being driven on highway must be 
kept at distance of at least 300 feet to rear of any vehicle im-
mediately preceding it, expressly provides that its provisions 
"shan not prevent overtaking and passing." 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Kern 
County. Robert B. Lambert, Judge. Affirmed. 
Actions for property damage to trucks arising out of col-
lision of vehicles. Judgment for plaintiff in each action, af-
firmed. 
Conron, Heard & James and Calvin H. Conron for Ap-
pellants. 
Kenneth J. Thayer, Dorsett M. Phillips, William A. Kur-
lander and Leslie G. MacGowan for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Defendants appeal from judgments award-
ing plaintiffs Baker and M & :M Livestock Transport Com-
pany damages for harm to their trucks arising out of a 
collision in which three other trucks were involved. The cases 
were consolidated for trial by the court sitting without a 
jury. 
Viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs the fol-
lowil1g appears: The collision occurred about 2 p. m. on a 
clear day on Highway 466 in the Tehachapi Mountains. The 
highway ran generally in an east-west direction and was 
marked with a broken center line. At the point of impact 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d. Automouiles, ~ 138; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 33. 
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it was about 34 feet wide including the shoulders, and on 
each side there was a steep embankment to a ravine below. 
'fhe upgrade to the east was estimated variously at 3 p('r 
cent to 6% per cent. 
Before the collision, three trucks averaging 60 feet in 
length and 8 feet in width, were proceeding upgrade in the 
eastbound lane. The first was the Automobile Forwarding 
Service Truck, a two-ton tractor-trailer loaded with four cars, 
which was driven by Charles French in its proper lime at 7 
to 8 miles an hour. Behind French was plaintiff Baker's 
truck, a top-type automobile carrier truck, which was un-
loaded. Following Baker was plaintiff M & M Livestock 
Transport Company's unloaded tractor-truck driven by Curtis 
Lacert. 
Prior to the collision Baker had been ascending the grade 
at about 32 miles per hour and he was able to accelerate 
his speed on the grade and was doing so. Thus there was 
evidence that Baker's truck was. capable of passing French'8 
truck safely considering the extent of the view ahead. When 
Baker pulled up behind French and commenced his maneuver 
to pass French, the latter veered sharply to the right as far 
as his truck would go and onto the shoulder, thus leaving 
about 9 feet between the left side of his truck and the center 
line. When Baker was passing on French's lefthand side he 
was going about 15 miles per hour. The right side of Baker's 
truck was 1 to 2 feet from the left side of French's. Al-
though Baker testified he estimated the left side of his truck 
was about 2 feet to the left of the center line, it could have 
been on or to the right of the center line on the basis of the 
above figures. When he started to make the passing maneuver, 
Baker had a clear view of the road ahead for 800 feet to a 
point where the road curved. No one was approaching from 
the east. While passing, Baker's truck "faltered" or 
"stopped" as described by various witnesses. That was due 
to a slipping of the gears which he had had repaired im-
mediately before the trip on which he was driving when the 
collision occurred. When the tractor portion of Baker's truck 
(20 feet long) and 2 feet of the trailer had passed French, 
a truck owned by defendant Alves and driven by defendant 
Madrid rounded the curve between 400 and 500 feet away, 
travelling west toward Baker and French at a speed of 50 
or 60 miles per hour. Madrid's truck weaved from right to 
left on the highway and finally collided with the right front 
end of Baker's truck and left front of French's truck, the 
:) 
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latter two trucks having stopped. Madrid's truck weighed 
65,000 pounds and was travelling downhill. Apparently he 
had little control over it. It was going 50 miles per hour 
a.t the time of the impact. 
Baker'8 truck was pushed back until it collided with the 
M & M truck. A moment later a second truck owned by 
tlefendant Alves and driven by defendant Gonzales came 
round the same curve from the east and, being unable to stop, 
skidded into the first Alves truck and turned over. The 
trucks caught fire, but the drivers escaped uninjured. 
Defendants assert the plaintiff Baker was contributively 
negligent as a matter of law in that he violated section 530 
of the Vehicle Code.· No contention is made that defendants 
were not negligent. 
As we read section 530, it requires that when passing, the 
view of the road and distance ahead of oncoming traffic be 
such that the passing maneuver may be made with safety 
and that the passing shall not be done on a curved road 
where, to do so, creates a hazard; it does not mean that when 
passing the conditions must be such that the passer guarantees 
he may safely pass or that he has necessarily violated the 
section by failing to complete the maneuver without accident, 
that is, the question is not entirely one of hindflght. Essen-
tially the passer is required to act in a reasonable and prudent 
manner under the circumstances such as are presented in 
this case. 
[1] To say that under the foregoing circumstances Baker 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law is not sus-
tained by the record. The trial court was justified in finding, 
as it did, that Baker was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence which proximately contributed to the collision. It is 
." (a) [ ••• Ret-u.rn to right-hand side.] Except when a roadway 
has Leen divided into three traffic lanes. no vehicle shall be driven to the 
left side of the center line of a roadway in overtaking and passing 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is 
elearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance 
ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made with-
out interfering with tho safe operation of any vehiclo approaching from 
the oPPol:litc diroction or any vchicle oYcrtal(en. In every event the over· 
taking velJiclc must I'cturn to the right-hand side of the roadway beforo 
coming within one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction. 
"(b) No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the 
roadway under the following condition s: 
"1. When approaching tile crest of a grade or upon a curve in the 
highway where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance 
as to create a hazard in thc c\'cut another vehicle mlght approach from 
the opposite direction." (Veh. Code, t 530.) 
) 
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true that. Baker dill 11\11 sllcc(>('d ill g"et.l ill~~ pm:l I"n'll.·I, :1I,d 
ahead of him on the righl. sid!' of the road 111'1"111"1' Madrid 
came within collision Jistall·:e. It may be that that failure 
is some indication that it was not safe for Baker to attempt 
to pass but his failure could be attributed to the slipping 
of the gears which was not his fault. In any case, however. 
we look at the situation as it appeared to a man of ordinary 
prudence at the time Baker commenced to pass French. As 
he commenced passing, French pulled over to the right in-
dicating he would have room even if there was approaching 
traffic. The view was clear for 800 feet. The grade was only 
3 per cent or 4 per cent and his truck was unloaded and had 
been previously gaining speed. As a person of ordinary 
prudence he was justified in assuming he could pass 
safely. He was not required to assume that an approaching 
vehicle 800 feet away would be travelling at such high and 
uncontrollable (considering the weight of Madrid's truck) 
speed that with that margin of safety he could not complete 
the passing maneuver. (See Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal.2d 712, 
715 [264 P.2d 1].) Certainly the question was one for the 
finder of fact, the trial court in the instant case. [2] Even 
if Baker made a mistake in judging his ability to pass safely, 
that would not necessarily be contributory negljgence. (65 
C.J.S., Negligence, § 2; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 33.) The 
question of whether a man of ordinary prudence would have 
endeavored to pass is peculiarly a question for the trier of 
fact as it involves an exercise of judgment probably more 
difficult than any other conduct in driving a motor vehicle. 
"But cases in which it can be said that the negligence of 
plaintiff contributes proximately to the accident as a matter 
of law are rare. The rule has been stated in various ways in 
a legion of cases, that contributory negligence is not estab-
lished as a matter of law unless the only reasonable hypothesis 
is that such negligence exists; that reasonable or sensible men 
could have drawn that conclusion and none other; that where 
there are different inferences that may be drawn, one for and 
one against, the one against will be followed; and that before 
it can be held as a matter of law that contributory negli-
gence exists, the evidence must point unerringly to that con-
clusion. (See Johnson v. Southern Pacific OQ., 154 Cal. 
285 [97 P. 520]; Wise v. Stott, 114 Cal. App. 702 [300 
P. 883]; Heitman v. Pacific Electric Ry. 00., 10 Cal.App. 
397 [102 P. 15] ; Daly v. Hinz, 113 Cal. 366 [45 P. 693]; 
Bobinet v. Hawks, 200 Cal 265 [252 P. 1045]; McVea v. 
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Nickols, 10;') Cal.App. 28 [286 P. 761] ; Schneider v. Market 
Rt1'eet Ry. Co., 134 Cal. 482 [66 P. 734] ; Walker v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 38 Cal.App. 377 1176 P. 175J j Zibbell v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 237 [116 P. 513] j Moss v. H. R. Boynton 
Co., 44 Cal.App. 474 [186 P. 631] j Green v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 53 Cal.App. 194 [199 P. 1059]; Kienlen v. Holt, 106 
Cal.App. 135 [288 P. 866] ; Grimes v. Richfield Oil Co., 106 
Cal.App. 416 [289 P. 245] ; Schellin v. North Alaska Salmon 
Co., 167 Cal. 103 [138 P. 723] ; Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing 
Co., 189 Cal. 335 f208 P. 125] ; Smith v. Southern Pac. Co., 
201 Cal. 57 [255 P. 500] ; Flores v. Fitzgerald, 204 Cal. 374 
[268 P. 369] ; Toschi v. Christian, 24 Ca1.2d 354 [149 P.2d 
848].)" (Anthony v. Hobbie, 25 Ca1.2d 814, 818 [155 P.2d 
826].) The cases cited by defendants are distinguishable. 
[3] Defendants' contention that contributory negligence 
must be imputed to M & M Livestock Transport Company, 
because Lacert was violating section 531 of the Vehicle Code· 
at the time of the collision, cannot be sustained. Section 531 
provides that a truck being driven on a highway must be 
kept at a distance of at least 300 feet to the rear of any 
vehicle immediately preceding it. The evidence is clear that 
the M & M truck was within a few feet of the rear of French's 
truck at the time of the collision, but section 531 expressly 
provides that its provisions "shall not prevent overtaking and 
passing. • . ." The trier of fact could reasonably infer that 
Lacert had pulled up close behind the slow-moving truck 
driven by French with the intention of passing it when the 
highway was clear. The evidence therefore supports the find-
ing that Lacert was not guilty of contributory negligence. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I agree that the evidence does not show, 
as a matter of law, any negligence of Baker proximately 
contributing to his injury. However, I do not agree with the 
construction which has been placed upon section 530 of the 
Vehicle Code. 
That statute defines the situation in which it is lawful to 
." (B) The driver ot any motor truck, or the driver ot any motor 
vellicle which is drawing or towing another vehicle, upon a roadway 
outside of a business or residence district shall keep the vehicle he is 
driving at a distance ot not less than 300 feet to the rear of any vehicle 
immediately preceding it being drinm in the same direction. The pro-
visions of this subdivl:.;lon shall llot prevent overtakini and pasl' 
ini •••• " 
) 
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attempt to overtake and pass another vehicle by driving on 
the left side of the center line. This may be done when the 
left side is free from oncoming traffic "for a sufficient dis· 
tance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be 
completely made without interfering with the safe operation 
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any 
vehicle overtaken." (Subd. (a).) The next sentence reads: 
"In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to the 
right-hand side of the roadway before coming within one 
hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction." The holding that the passer need only "act in a 
reasonable and prudent manner under the circumstances such 
as are presented in this case" gives no effect to the "t.andaril 
of care required by the Legislature. 
In Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School D·ist., 29 Ca1.2d 58i 
[177 P.2d 279], we said: "[T]he proper conduct of a reason-
able person under particular situations may become settled 
by judicial decision or be prescribed by statute or ordinance 
• ,,0 An act or failure to act beiow the statutory standard 
is negligence per se, or negligence as a matter of law. And 
if the evidence establishes that the plaintiff's or defendant's 
violation of the statute or ordinance proximately caused the 
injury and no excuse or justification for violation is shown 
by the evidence, responsibility may be fixed upon the violator 
without other proof of failure to exercise due care. (Cita-
tions.) However, in an emergency, or under unusual con-
ditions, it is generally held that circumstances may be shown 
to excuse the violation. ... [T]he fact which will excuse 
the violation of a statute has been defined by the court as one 
resulting 'from causes or things beyond the control of the 
person charged with the violation. t (Citations.) . . .. In the 
application of this rule each violation of a statutory require-
ment must be considered in connection with the surrounding 
circumstances. Ordinarily, the excuse relied upon by the 
violator presents a question of fact for the jury's determina-
tion." (Pp. 587-590.) The principles stated and applied in 
the Satterlee case were followed in Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal. 
2d 474, 480 [218 P.2d 531]. 
Without question, Baker failed to return to his proper lane 
"before coming within one hundred feet of any vehicle ap-
proaching" and presumptively was negligent. However, a 
proper disposition of the case requires a determination as 
to whether Baker's conduct was exell~ed and, if not, whether 
his negligence contributed to the inj Ui'.,y. 
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With regard to the first issue, there is evidence that when 
Bakel' drove out of his lane to pass, the truck preceding him 
pulled onto the shoulder to its right, leaving sufficient room 
to pass in the right-hand lane without crossing the center 
line. The testimony also shows a mechanical failure in 
Baker's truck while he was attempting to pass, that Madrid 
approached at an excessive rate of speed and driving in an 
erratic manner, and that the truck preceding Baker had 
stopped at the time of the impact. It may btl inferred from 
this eviden~e that Baker was excused from returning to his 
proper lane because of a combination of the excessive speed 
of Madrid's vehicle and Baker's inability either to fall be-
hind the preceding truck because it had stopped or to get 
ahead of it because of the mechanieal failure in his own truck. 
But even if Baker's violation of the statute was not justified, 
I do not believe there is any basis for holding, as a matter of 
law, that his negligence proximately contributed to the acci-
dent. The record shows that Madrid's truClk was veering from 
side to side and had crossed the center line sufficiently to 
strike not only Baker's vehicle but the one preceding him, 
which admittedly was ill the proper lane. Although Madrid's 
truck may have swerved because of the application of brakes 
and the driver's attempt to avoid a collision, the trier of fact 
reasonably might have found that it was so far out of con-
trol when rounding the curve as to collide with BaIH'r's 
vehicle. The latter was entirely within its proper lane, or 
two or three feet to the left of the center line as the record 
seems to indicate. 
I, therefore, concur in affirming the judgment in its en-
tirety. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRA YNOR, J., Dissenting.-I agree that the judgment in 
favor of plaintiff M & M Livestock Trallsport Co. should be 
affirmed, but I cannot agree that plaintiff Baker was not con-
tributively negligent as a matter of law. 
Section 530 of the Vehicle Code provides not only that 
overtaking and passing shall be "com pletely made with on t 
interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approach-
ing from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken," 
but that" In every eve11t the overtaking vehicle must return 
to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within 
one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction." (Italics added.) Thus, even if "safe operation" 
) 
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in the first clause llll'(lIIS what a f('us(luahl,v prudent driver 
would regard as "saf~ npf'ralion," the standard of care re-
quired by the second clause is not what the reasonably pru-
dent driver would do under the circumstances but what the 
Legislature has commanded, namely, that thc driver of an 
overtaking vehicle return to the right-hand side of the road-
way within the distance prescribed unless prevented froll 
doing so by " 'causes or things beyond [his] control .... '" 
(Ornales v. W1'gger, 35 Ca1.2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d 531J.) 
Baker did not return to the right hand side of the roadway 
within the distance prescribed. Nor could he have done so 
even if his gears had not slipped or if French had not stopped 
his truck. It is undisputed that those incidents occurred 
simultaneously with the appearance of defendant's truck 
round the curve. The evidence viewed most favorably to 
Baker clearly shows that, even if the gears had not slipped 
and F'rench had not stopped, Baker could not have completed 
the passing maneuver or fallen behind French and thus re-
turned to the right-hand side of the roadway within 100 feet 
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction even 
at a speed of only 55 miles an hour. (See Veh. Code, § 511.) 
To leave to the trier of fact the question whether Baker's 
violation of the statute was excused, i.e., whether he could 
reasonably believe that he could pass without crossing the 
center line or return to his proper lane without endangering 
oncoming traffic, is to substitute for the statutory rule the 
view of the trier of fact as to what constitutes reasonablp con-
duct. (See my concurring opinion in Satterlee v. Orange 
Glenn School Dist., 29 Ca1.2d 581,594 [177 P.2d 279].) 
I find no evidence in the record to support the conclusion 
that the accident would have occurred even if Baker had 
not attempted his ill-fated passing maneuver. The evidence 
clearly shows that Madrid was in control of his truck and 
was in his proper lane until he rounded the curve, saw Baker '8 
truck in a position of danger, and applied his brakes in an 
attempt to avoid the collision, There can be no doubt that 
Baker's violation of the statute was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the collision and was, therefore, a contributing 
cause thereof. 
Spence, J" concurred. 
